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Abstract 
This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still 
lacking in the process. The barriers for transition are identified. This includes an 
analysis of the different factors behind the steep fall in production in the first years of 
transition. It is shown that countries implementing a tough stabilization and a 
comprehensive and consequent liberalization have been most successful in the 
process. A fast and comprehensive privatization, on the other hand, has not been 
sufficient for the necessary restructuring of enterprises. Decisive for success in 
transition has been transformation of the state as a crucial part of the development of 
new market institutions implementing well functioning, clear and stable rules of the 
game for private enterprises. The institutional development has been important for 
the attractiveness of foreign investments and these FDI have been important for 
restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition process. 
 
1. Introduction - some key questions 
The transition in Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union) has been much 
more difficult than expected both by experts and the population. Why has transition 
been so difficult?  Why did production fall steeply in the first years of the transition 
process? These questions will be answered in the following. It will be shown that 
countries implementing a tough stabilization and a comprehensive and consequent 
liberalization have been most successful in the process. A fast and comprehensive 
privatization, on the other hand, has not been sufficient for the necessary restructur-
ing of enterprises. Decisive for success in transition has been transformation of the 
state as a crucial part of the development of new market institutions implementing 
well functioning, clear and stable rules of the game for the private enterprises. 
Building up the new structure of institutions is still in process in all transition 
economies, but there are huge differences in the stages of development. The front-
runners are: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia closely fol-
lowed by Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. The institutional development has been im-
portant for the attractiveness of foreign investments and these FDI have been impor-
tant for restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition process.  
 
This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still 
lacking in the process. First the barriers for transition will be identified. This includes 
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an analysis of the different factors behind the steep fall in production in the first years 
of transition. Then, a short discussion follows of the necessary policies of stabiliza-
tion, liberalization and privatization. The importance of a well functioning state will 
be emphasized and it will be explained how international cooperation and FDI have 
had great impact on the development in some of the frontrunner countries.  
 
2. Barriers for transition 
The political revolutions 1989-91 in the East European countries marked the start of 
comprehensive transformations not only of the economic institutions in the transition 
from command economies to market economies and of a fundamental restructuring of 
production and the process of production. The transition also included the creation 
and development of new democratic political institutions and a cultural liberation 
with deep changes in habits, norms and values (Mygind, 1994).  
 
The dissolution of the old system, the breaking up of most economic networks 
between enterprises and between countries and steep cuts in production took place in 
a rather short period. On the other hand, building up new links, new products, and 
new production methods demanded huge resources - time, capital and human 
qualifications. Lack of these resources caused bottlenecks for the transition process. 
 
Before transition, production was determined by direct orders from central planners. 
In a market system it is the demand by the consumers and market based costs, which 
determine what enterprises shall produce. Calculations for the early stage of tran-
sition based on world market prices showed that around one third of production had a 
negative value added. In these enterprises the value of inputs such as oil and other 
raw materials were higher than the market value of outputs, which could only be sold 
at quite low prices. Labor and capital in these enterprises were not used for 
production, but destruction! (Hare and Hughes, 1992). The other two thirds of 
production were either produced with losses or with a very low return on assets. The 
transition to world market prices meant that much of the huge physical capital stock 
and much of the human capital built up in the command economy turned out to be of 
very low value measured with the world market as benchmark. 
 
Adjustment to market conditions, therefore, resulted in a drastic fall of production 
and after a somewhat longer period of adjustment also a fall in employment in the old 
industrial enterprises. However, employment was cut much faster in Central Europe 
compared with CIS-countries where the workers stayed in the large failing industrial 
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enterprises although they had cut down most of the production. All over Eastern 
Europe labor productivity fell in the first years of transition. The turnaround based on 
cuts in employment happened earlier in Central Europe compared to the CIS 
countries (EBRD 1999, WB 1996). 
 
 
Table 1 - Growth in GDP 1989-2006 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006
         estimate project. 1989=100
Albania 9.8 -10 -28 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -10.9 8.6 13.2 *6.5 7.1 4.3 5.7 6.7 5.5 5.0 144
Belarus 8.0 -3.0 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 4.7 5.0 *7.0 11.4 9.2 9.5 133
Bulgaria 0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -9.4 -5.6 4.0 2.3 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.7 5.5 6.0 99
Croatia -1.6 -7.1 -21.1 -11.7 -8.0 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.5 -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.6 5.3 3.8 4.3 *4.6 105
Czech R 1.4 -1.2 -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.2 -0.7 -0.8 1.3 *3.6 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.2 129
Estonia 8.1 -6.5 -13.6 -14.2 -8.8 -1.6 4.5 4.4 11.1 4.4 0.3 10.8 7.7 8 *7.1 8.1 10.5 8.9 142
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 *6.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 5.2 4.1 3.5 133
Latvia 6.8 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 2.2 -0.9 3.8 8.3 4.7 3.3 8.4 8.0 6.5 7.2 8.5 *10.2 9.0 110
Lithuania 1.5 -5 -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.0 7.3 -1.7 3.9 7.2 6.8 10.5 7.0 7.5 *7.0 105
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 *6.2 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.2 1.1 1.4 3.8 5.3 3.4 5.0 156
Romania -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.0 -6.1 -4.8 -1.1 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.4 *4.1 6.5 112
Russia 0.0 0.0 -5.0 -14.8 -8.7 -12.7 -4.0 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.4 6.5 96
Slovak R 1.4 -2.5 -15.9 -6.7 -3.7 6.2 5.8 6.1 4.6 4.2 1.5 2.0 *3.2 4.1 4.2 5.4 6.1 6.4 132
Slovenia -1.8 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 1.7 5.8 4.9 3.6 *4.8 3.6 5.6 4.1 2.7 3.5 2.7 4.4 4.0 4.5 142
Ukraine 4.0 -4.0 -10.6 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 2.6 6.0 62
Based on EBRD-2006. The year when passing the start level marked by * 
 
The deep strategic restructuring with development of new products, access to new 
markets and introduction of new organizational structures and production methods in 
the enterprises is a much more long term and resource intensive process. It is much 
easier and faster to cut production and employment than to build up new systems 
which need capital, technological and management expertise as well as developed 
market institutions. Therefore, the result was a steep fall in production followed by a 
rather slow, but in the successful transitional economies, accelerating recovery of 
production. There have been important differences in how fast each transitional 
country has turned around. Poland was the first to show positive growth. In 1996 
Poland passed the 1989-production level marked by * in table 1. Slovenia passed the 
starting point in 1997. Albania, the Czech Republic and Hungary passed the point in 
2000; Slovakia in 2001; Belarus and Estonia in 2003, Latvia and Romania in 2005, 
Lithuania in 2006; while Bulgaria and Russia is expected to pass in 2007 and Ukraine 
still have some years to go. A weighted average for Central and Eastern Europe 
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including the Baltic Countries shows that the 1989 level was passed in 2000 (EBRD 
2000). The 2006 production level for Ukraine it is only 62% of the 1989 level, see 
Table 1. The level for Belarus is somewhat misleading. It is still to a high degree a 
command economy. If the Belarussian growth is measured in USD the index end up 
to be only around 50% of the 1989 level, while the Baltic countries are around the 
double of this. 
 
The barriers for the development of the new political system can be found in the risk 
that the old elite converts its political power to new forms in the new system, and in 
the lack of democratic traditions and experience. An important barrier is the 
overwhelming burden of consolidation of the democratic institutions in a period 
where new legislation is needed in almost all areas. Many political decisions must be 
made without knowing the effects of the policies because of the high uncertainty in 
the early years of transition. It is impossible to implement the full market model in 
one step. In most areas a long transitional period will be dominated by “half 
solutions” leaving a lot of holes to be exploited by corrupt elements inside and in 
relation to the administrative system. The uncertainty in the political system is an 
important reason why it has taken several years to develop stable political parties, 
simply because it is difficult to develop and implement stable political programs in a 
very unstable environment. 
 
The barriers for the cultural transition can be divided in two main types. The 
dissolution of the rigid Soviet system meant that the deep cultural values, that had 
been suppressed now flourished again. Religion and national conscience regained 
importance in many countries. Many of the conflicts frozen down in the Soviet 
system were unfrozen, and in some areas conflicts heated up further and exploded in 
ethnic religious wars. Such conflicts seriously delayed the transition process in 
Caucasus and in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Norms and routines from the command economies have prevailed for many groups. 
Especially the older generations have problems understanding and following the 
wave of drastic changes. On the other hand the transition gives a lot of opportunities, 
especially for young people. Therefore, the gap between generations has deepened in 
many countries of transition. Especially in the CIS-countries without a collective 
consciousness about the time before the command economy, there is strong inertia 
concerning the change of norms and habits. This is a main barrier for the develop-
ment of the new market economy. 
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Ideally, the transition of economic institutions should be made in one step. With the 
exception of GDR, which was taken over by BRD and rapidly enrolled in the German 
institutional system, it is not possible to implement a real “big bang”. Even in coun-
tries performing a tough economic shock therapy like Poland and Estonia there is still 
a way to go in building up and implementing all the necessary market institutions.  
 
The key elements in a market economy are: market-based prices as information 
signals and private ownership with decentralized control and decentralized incentives 
for the owners. There must be direct correspondence between the right to control and 
the financial rights to returns and capital gains. The implementation of these elements 
is done through stabilization, liberalization and privatization - see the next sections. 
 
3. The necessity of stabilization  
In all the command economies there was a “monetary overhang” because of constant 
prices combined with unbalanced expansion of purchasing power. This overhang was 
reflected in excess demand of goods. Queues and empty shops were not signs of too 
low production. They were signs of too low prices in relation to purchasing power. 
To implement the market mechanism the prices were liberalized in the start of 
transition. In countries with a huge monetary overhang like in the former Soviet 
Union the result was an explosion in prices. Hungary, which already had market 
oriented prices in the 1980s saw only a small increase in prices in 1990, see Table 2, 
while price liberalization in Russia in January 1992 resulted in a 300% jump in prices 
just for one month. 
 
High and persistent inflation means that the price system sends uncertain signals. The 
functioning of the decentralized information system and thus the market mechanism 
is hampered. This is the reason why stabilization of prices is important. In countries 
such as Russia and Ukraine too lax economic policy resulted in the first half of the 
1990s in a spiral of price increases combined with increasing nominal wages, 
continued depreciation of the currency, expansion of the monetary supply and soft 
credits to enterprises. The high inflation continued for several years. The Central 
European countries, on the contrary, implemented quite tough stabilization policies. 
This also happened a few years later in the Baltic countries. From table 2 it can be 
seen that the inflation in these countries fell under the critical level of 40-50% by 
1994/95. At this time inflation was still very high in Bulgaria, Romania and the CIS 
countries. However, through tightening of monetary policy and currency policy with 
a rather stable exchange rate Russia and most other CIS countries succeeded in 
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stabilizing inflation from 1995. The currency crisis in Russia in August 1998 gave 
another push to inflation, but the following tough stabilization policy gave inflation 
levels, which do not seriously hamper the functioning of the market mechanism.  
 
With the Russian crisis there was a backlash in demand, which limited both growth 
and inflation in most transitional economies in 1998 and 1999. In the later years 
inflation has been quite low in Central- and Eastern Europe. With relatively fixed 
exchange rates and an increase in productivity this leaves room for a real appreciation 
- inflation can be a bit higher than inflation for the most important trading partners 
(the old members of EU). 
 
Table 2 - Inflation 1990-2006 (consumer prices, change in annual average) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
         esti-
mate
pro-
jection
Albania 0.0 35.5 226.0 85.0 22.6 7.8 12.7 33.2 20.6 0.4 0.1 3.1 5.2 2.4 2.9 2.3 2.3
Belarus 4.7 94.1 970.8 1190 2221 709.3 52.7 63.8 73.2 293.8 168.9 61.4 42.6 28.4 18.1 10.3 7.0
Bulgaria 26.3 333.5 82.0 73.0 96.3 62.0 123.0 1082 22.2 0.7 9.9 7.4 5.9 2.3 6.1 5.0 3.0
Croatia 609.5 123.0 665.5 1518 97.6 2.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 6.2 4.9 2.2 1.8 2.1 3.3 3.5
Czech R. 9.7 52.0 11.1 20.8 9.9 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8 0.2 2.8 1.9 2.9
Estonia 23.1 210.5 1076 89.8 47.7 29.0 23.1 11.2 8.1 3.3 4.0 5.8 3.6 1.3 3.0 4.1 3.6
Hungary 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 4.8 4.9 6.8 3.6 4.0
Latvia 10.5 172.2 951.2 109.2 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.4 4.7 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.9 6.2 6.7 6.2
Lithua-
nia 8.4 224.7 1021 410.4 72.1 39.6 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.3 -1.2 1.2 2.7 3.1
Poland 585.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 10.1 5.5 1.7 0.7 3.5 2.1 1.6
Romania 5.1 170.2 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.5 6.5
Russia 5.6 92.7 1526 875.0 311.4 197.7 47.8 14.7 27.6 86.1 20.8 21.6 15.7 13.7 11.0 11.3 9.8
Slovak R 10.8 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.0 7.1 3.3 8.5 7.5 2.7 4.5
Slovenia 549.7 117.7 207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.4 7.5 5.6 3.6 2.5 2.5
Ukraine 4.2 91.0 1210 4734 891.0 377.0 80.0 15.9 10.5 22.7 28.2 12.0 0.8 5.2 9.0 13.5 8.4
Based on EBRD-2006 
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 there is a clear connection between lower inflation and 
growth in production. Countries with fast and consequent stabilization and controlled 
inflation had, after a few years, growth in production while the fall in production 
continued for several years in the CIS countries with postponed stabilization. The 
accession to EU is another element putting a pressure on inflation in the frontrunner 
transition countries. However, increasing excise taxes meant a slight increase in 
prices in the accession year 2004. With exchange rate fixed to the Euro and a fast 
catching up of productivity and GDP-levels the Baltic countries will also have a 
catching up of price levels. This may result in an inflation level about 3% higher than 
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the inflation in the Euro-area for the coming years (see Mygind, 2006) meaning that 
they will not be able to fulfill the Euro access-criteria. 
 
4. The necessity of liberalization - status for implementation 
Liberalization - deregulation through transfer of control and incentives from the state 
to decentralized units - is an important element of developing the market mechanism. 
Successful liberalization also means stable and clear rules of the game for private 
enterprises and institutions monitoring competition and securing a level playing field. 
Price liberalization (except for specific areas such as energy, public transport and 
housing) was implemented rather fast in most countries. At the same time the 
frontrunners implemented a fast and comprehensive liberalization of foreign trade.  
 
The opportunity for establishing new private enterprises is also an important part of 
the market economy. However, it is not only important to create access to entry. It is 
also important to implement the possibility and clear rules for exit from the market. 
Therefore, a well functioning legal framework for bankruptcy is important. Exit 
means that non-performing assets are taken over by new owners, who will have the 
opportunity to make better use of these assets. If exits are blocked by soft credits and 
subsidies inefficient state supported enterprises can block the entrance of new and 
potentially more efficient enterprises.  
 
Contrary to price-liberalization, which was implemented rather fast and consequent in 
most countries, opening up for foreign competition showed more variation. Even 
larger differences could be found in the implementation of bankruptcy procedures. 
Countries such as Estonia and Hungary implemented tough procedures quite early in 
the process while countries such as the Czech Republic and Russia were more 
hesitant in implementing the hard budgets for their enterprises. 
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Table 3   Status for liberalization based on EBRD-Transition Report 2006  
 Price 
liberalization 
Liberalize 
foreign 
trade and   
exchange 
Compe-
tition 
policy 
Bank reform 
liberalize  
interest rate 
Securities 
market and 
non-bank 
finance inst
Bankruptcy 
legislation 
 
(EBRD 99) 
Commercial 
Law 
 
(EBRD 2002) 
Albania             4+  4+ 2 . 3 - 2 - 1 . 3 .
Belarus 3 - 2+ 2 . 2 - 2 . 2 . 3 .
Bulgaria 4+ 4+ 3 - 4 - 3 - 4 - 4 -
Croatia 4 . 4+ 2+ 4 . 3 . 4 - 3+ 
Czech Rep 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 . 4 - 3+ 4 -
Estonia 4+ 4+ 4 - 4 . 4 - 4 - 4 -
Hungary 4+ 4+ 3+ 4 . 4 . 4 - 4 -
Latvia 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 - 3 . 3+ 3+
Lithuania 4+ 4+ 3+ 4 - 3 . 3 . 4 -
Poland 4+ 4+ 3 . 4 - 4 - 3+ 3+
Romania 4+ 4+ 3 - 3 . 2 . 3 . 4 -
Russia 4 . 3+ 2+ 3 - 3 . 3 - 3+
Slovak R 4+ 4+ 3+ 4 - 3 . 3 . 3 .
Slovenia 4 . 4+ 3 - 3+ 3 - 4 . 3+
Ukraine 4 . 4 - 2+ 3 . 2+ 2 . 3 .
Based on EBRD-2006, index  from 1 (no liberalization) to 4+ (full liberalization) 
 
There is a strong connection between this part of liberalization and the development 
of market institutions related to the financial system, banks and the capital market, 
and to the development of institutions securing private property rights. This part of 
the liberalization process belongs to the second tier of institutional reforms, which 
takes much more time to implement. 
 
5. Privatization and corporate governance 
Privatization of enterprises is necessary for developing decentralized control and 
decentralized incentives such as financial ownership rights. The owners and 
managers need incentives to use the resources efficiently. This is closely connected to 
the development of efficient governance systems between owners, managers and 
other stakeholders related to the activities of the enterprises. 
 
However, it is difficult to implement privatization in transitional economies because 
many market institutions are not fully developed - a developed banking system, a 
well functioning stock market, reliable information about the economic situation of 
enterprises etc. It is very difficult to give a fair valuation of the assets because the 
markets are undeveloped and volatile with high uncertainty about the future 
development. The population lacks information and lacks capital to buy the assets. 
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The solution to the last problem has in countries like the Czech Republic, Russia and 
Lithuania been privatization through vouchers - privatization coupons freely 
distributed to the population. These vouchers were used for auctions of the 
enterprises to be privatized. Investment funds often played an important role in this 
process. In this way the problem of lacking capital was solved, and it was possible to 
have a high equality at least in the initial round of distribution of the assets.  
 
In other countries such as Estonia and Hungary the most important method of 
privatization was direct sale to the investor who could offer the best combination of 
price, and guarantees of future investment and employment. Direct sale favored 
capital owners, and especially foreign investors played an important role in countries 
using this method of privatization. In other countries such as Russia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia insiders, managers and other employees, had strong advantages for taking 
over their enterprises including large and medium sized enterprises. In other countries 
such insider takeovers were only frequent for small privatization - privatization of 
small enterprises and sub-units of larger enterprises. 
 
Table 4   Status for privatization 2006 and method for large privatization  
 Private 
sector 
% of 
GDP 
Large 
privatiza-
tion   (large 
enterprises) 
Small  
privatiza-
tion   (small 
enterprises) 
Governance
and  
enterprise 
restructuring
Primary 
privatization 
method 
Secondary  
privati-
zation  
method 
Peak 
privati-
zation  
years 
Albania 75 3 . 4 . 2+ insider voucher 1995-96 
Belarus 25 1 . 2+ 1 . not privatized   
Bulgaria 75 4 . 4 . 3 - direct sale voucher 1997 
Croatia 60 3+ 4+ 3 . insider voucher 1995 
Czech Rep 80 4 . 4+ 3+ voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Estonia 80 4 . 4+ 4 - direct sale voucher 1994-95 
Hungary 80 4 . 4+ 4 - direct sale insider 1992-96 
Latvia 70 4 - 4+ 3 . direct sale voucher 1996-97 
Lithuania 75 4 . 4+ 3 . insider/voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Poland 75 3+ 4+ 4 - insider/voucher direct sale 1997 
Romania 70 4 - 4 - 3 - insider direct sale 1995 
Russia 65 3 . 4 . 2+ insider/voucher direct sale 1993-94 
Slovak R. 80 4 . 4+ 4 - direct sale voucher 1992-96 
Slovenia 65 3 . 4+ 3 . insider voucher 1995-96 
Ukraine 65 3 . 4 . 2 . insider direct sale 1998-99 
EBRD 2006 privatization-index: 1=no privatization, 4+=full privatization.         Method: own estimate 
 
A fast and comprehensive privatization is not sufficient for developing a system of 
efficient corporate governance. Also a well functioning state is necessary (see next 
section) and it is necessary to have well functioning institutions for securing property 
rights, a developed capital market, access to reliable information about enterprises for 
existing and potential investors, and well functioning bankruptcy procedures. There 
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are many examples of fast and comprehensive privatization, which did not lead to 
efficient corporate governance:  
 
The main part of the large privatization in the Czech Republic was done through 
vouchers in the period 1992-94. After the privatization rounds most of the assets were 
controlled by investment funds again controlled by the large banks. However, state 
ownership dominated most of these banks. Therefore, it could be questioned whether 
the assets were truly privatized. The main problem, however, was that the administra-
tors of the investment funds had de facto control with the enterprises in their 
portfolio. The real owners who had invested their vouchers in the investment funds 
were outside influence. This gap between control on one side and the financial 
returns on the other gave the administrators the opportunity to exploit their control 
and tunnel values out of the enterprises to the benefit of other enterprises directly 
owned by them. Similar ways of inefficient corporate governance systems resulting 
in tunneling are also known from Russia and other economies in transition.  
 
6. The importance of a well functioning state 
Closely connected to the quality of corporate governance of the enterprises is the 
quality of the governance of the state. Clear and stable rules of the game are a must 
for a well functioning market economy. Here we can distinguish between the 
development of the political dimension - the development of democratic institutions - 
and the administrative dimension - the quality of the state bureaucracy. The two 
dimensions support each other and there is a close connection between the 
development of democratic institutions and the progress in economic reforms. Figure 
1 shows the relation between the development of democracy as measured by Freedom 
House on a scale from 1 (full democracy) to 7 (dictatorship) and an average of 
EBRD’s reform indicators from 4.3 (fully developed reforms) to 1 (no reforms). The 
numbers are based on 1999 data. 
Figure 1. The relation between democracy and economic reforms
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It is worth noting that a well functioning state is not the same as a strong state with 
the head of state in power for a long period. Stability of power is not a guarantee for a 
positive development. A “strong” state with lack of democratic institutions and lack 
of political competition means limited possibility for the opposition to criticize and 
challenge the current head of state. It is important that the government and the 
administration can be criticized and corrected. The old Soviet system was an example 
of a stable, but petrified state power, that lacked correction mechanisms and was not 
able to make the necessary flexible adjustments to exploit the opportunities of the 
technological development. 
 
A strong opposition performing a persistent and strong monitoring of both the 
political elite and of the administrative bureaucracy can unveil inefficiencies, 
corruption and abuse of power. The free press has an important role, but is it also 
important to have a well functioning legislative system with clear rules and 
consequent and fair implementation through an efficient and independent court 
system. Some Central European countries have an advantage in this respect because 
of their roots in a well functioning court system before World War 2. 
 
The EU-integration process supported a further development and check of the quality 
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of the democratic institutions and especially of the administrative capacity of the 
state. This is another explanation why the best functioning transitional states are 
found among the new EU members. In the accession process the applicants had to 
strengthen the state functions such as a transparent and fairly implemented tax 
system, and efficient and fair regulation of enterprises in relation to environment and 
safety at the workplace. 
 
7. Restructuring of enterprises 
One of the most important problems of the command economy was the insufficient 
use of the human and technological resources to develop and produce competitive 
products. The main reason behind the steep fall in production at the beginning of 
transition was, as earlier mentioned, the gap between the production structure of the 
command economy and the new structure adjusted to the competitive market 
economy. This transition of production is directly linked to the restructuring of 
enterprises. The defensive restructuring, cutting away unprofitable production and 
cutting down the number of employees, was implemented in the first years of 
transition although it was implemented slower and less consequently in the CIS 
countries.  
 
Deep strategic restructuring means building up the new structure of production with 
development of new products, new production methods, new technology, retraining 
of the employees, implementation of new management methods, new structures of 
organization, new networks to suppliers, new marketing methods and new markets. 
Strategic restructuring takes a long time and demands large capital inputs. At the 
same time new management skills must be developed – training of old and new 
managers in strategy, accounting, marketing, organizational behavior etc. has been a 
persistent bottleneck in all countries in transition. 
 
Strategic restructuring is not only taking place in existing enterprises. Starting up new 
enterprises is a very important element in building up the new structure of 
production. This is especially important for sectors like trade and services, which had 
a low priority under the command economy. Closing down and/or breaking up old 
giant industrial enterprises and transfer of employees and physical assets to new 
enterprises is often the most efficient form of deep restructuring. The early success of 
the Polish economy is closely connected to the very dynamic development of new 
small and medium sized enterprises. The Polish privatization was rather slow, but 
new private enterprises contributed to fast growth in the private sector from the early 
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start of the transition process. 
 
Bureaucratic barriers, lack of transparency in legislation, uncertainty in relation to 
more or less criminal networks, and uncertainty about the market development in 
general limited the possibilities and the dynamic development for small and medium 
sized enterprises in most CIS countries.  
 
The societal framework including the quality of the state is a very important factor 
for strategic restructuring. At the same time corporate governance of enterprises plays 
a crucial role. It is important which groups take over the ownership of the enterprises 
in the privatization process and in the post privatization change of ownership 
structures. The privatization and lack of regulation of investment funds in the Czech 
Republic is an example of a bad corporate governance system, which for some years 
hampered the incentives for strategic restructuring. 
 
The Russian privatization has been criticized for the strong emphasis on insider-
takeovers by management and broad groups of the other employees. Experts have 
called this: “half privatization” and some evidence have been presented showing that 
insider owned enterprises have problems getting enough capital for restructuring. 
However, there is contradictory evidence showing that insider owned companies 
often perform better that outsider owned domestic enterprises (Mygind 2000). The 
delay in restructuring in Russian enterprises will probably not be explained by the 
ownership structure. Instead, the unfavorable conditions in the institutional 
framework around the enterprises must be blamed. One of the leading economies in 
transition, Slovenia, with the highest GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, has a 
corporate governance system with many employee owned enterprises. Note, however, 
that there is quite clear evidence that enterprises owned by foreign core investors are 
in front concerning strategic restructuring. This will be further discussed in the 
following section. 
 
8. Foreign Direct Investment - importance and development  
The explanation behind the strong strategic restructuring in foreign owned enterprises 
shall be found in the fact that foreign investors have strong advantages concerning 
access to capital, management expertise, new technology and international networks. 
Usually the foreign investor constitutes a strong core owner with a dominant share of 
ownership. This means that there are no corporate governance problems under the 
assumption that the overall institutional framework guarantees the property rights. 
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The countries with the highest foreign direct investment per capita are characterized 
by advanced transition and a quite well functioning state with clear and transparent 
rules for enterprises and foreign investors. Czech, Hungary and Estonia are leading 
measured per capita. Already in the 1980s Hungary had opened up for foreign 
investments mostly in the form of joint ventures. The high level of foreign 
investments has been an important reason behind Hungary’s advanced development 
in relation to strategic restructuring and in relation to the development of a 
competitive industry. However, some evidence points in the direction that the 
technological and other positive spin-offs to the domestic part of the industry were 
rather modest (Hunya, 1997). The fall in FDI for some of the leading countries in the 
later years is because the acquisitions in relation to privatizations have ended. 
 
Table 5 Foreign Direct Investment inflows per year and accumulated 1990-2005 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1990-2005 
cumulative
                                                                    millions USD                                                                              $/capita
Albania   20 58 53 70 90 48 45 41 143 207 135 178 332 260 1680 525
Belarus   7 18 11 15 105 352 203 444 119 96 247 172 164 305 2256 230
Bulgaria 4 56 42 40 105 90 109 505 537 819 1002 813 905 2097 3443 2223 12789 1661
Croatia   13 120 117 114 511 538 935 1472 1087 1564 1126 2133 1262 1695 12687 2883
Czech R.    654 869 2562 1428 1300 3718 6324 4986 5641 8483 2101 4974 1099154032 5246
Estonia   82 162 215 202 151 267 581 305 387 542 284 919 1049 2853 7998 6152
Hungary 2950 2955 4892 2286 5104 3300 4167 3335 3312 2764 3936 2994 2162 2137 4654 6699 56107 5555
Latvia   29 45 214 180 382 521 357 347 413 132 254 292 699 632 4496 1955
Lithua-
i
  10 30 31 73 15 355 926 486 379 446 732 179 773 1009 5581 1641
Poland 291 678 1715 1875 3659 4498 4908 6365 7270 9343 5714 4131 4123 6159 1287 7724 75722 1987
Romania  40 77 94 341 419 263 1215 2031 1041 1037 1157 1144 2213 6517 6388 23977 1104
Russia   1161 1211 690 2066 2579 4865 2761 3309 2714 2748 3461 7958 154441460065567 455
Slovak 
R
  179 273 258 370 231 707 428 1925 1584 4094 669 756 1261 1908 13974 2588
Slovenia  111 113 117 151 174 334 216 107 136 370 1686 337 333 827 496 5169 2584
Ukraine   200 200 159 267 521 623 743 496 595 792 693 1424 1715 7808 7924 344
Based on UNCTAD (2006) 
 
 
Foreign investments are often motivated by access to the market of the host country. 
However, there are increasing motivations based on the exploitation of competitive 
factor inputs, especially the cheap highly qualified labor force (Meyer, 1998). Often 
the two motives are combined. The host country is an important market and at the 
same time the foreign investor uses the factors of production to build up exports to 
other Eastern European countries or to export back to the West. Furthermore, there is 
a connection between opening foreign trade and the increase in foreign investments. 
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9. Status and perspectives for the remaining transition process 
Has the transition been too tough? Because of the drastic fall in production and living 
standards the first answer could be yes. However, there is much variation in the 
development of production for different countries. The evidence shows that the most 
consequent reformers have been most successful. The majority of the population in 
these countries has now living conditions at least as good as before the transition 
started. This level has been reached after a tough period with high costs for many 
groups such as retired people, most employees in the public sector, workers in large 
failing enterprises etc. Many mistakes have been made and some countries are still 
well below the starting point. 
 
Reforms must be adjusted to the specific conditions in each country. But this 
argument has often been used as an excuse for slow and inconsistent reforms. It is 
hardly too tough policies, but hesitant and contradictory reforms combined with a 
badly functioning state, which is to blame for the lacking, or hopefully postponed, 
success in several countries. There is a close connection between the success of the 
reforms, the quality of the state and foreign investments and opening toward the 
developed market in Western Europe. The countries most advanced in the transition 
process are also the countries most advanced in the integration process with EU and 
they also have the highest level of foreign investments.  Foreign direct investment 
plays an important role in the current stage of transition with focus on restructuring at 
the enterprise level. 
 
These elements points toward the future transition with further integration with 
Western Europe and further restructuring of enterprises and integration into 
international production networks. There is still some way left in restructuring 
production even in the most advanced transitional countries. Even though these 
countries have an educational level comparable to most EU countries they need to 
invest a lot of capital in infrastructure and a new restructured production base. The 
qualifications of the labor force must be further adjusted to the new needs. Further 
development of most institutions is crucial especially concerning financial markets, 
the court system and the development of the administrative capacity of the state. 
 
In the coming years we will probably see an extension of the gap in Eastern Europe 
between groups of countries with different speeds in relation to transition and EU-
integration. In the frontline we have Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic and 
Hungary closely followed by Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia and soon also Croatia, 
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Bulgaria and Romania while the remaining countries in the Balkan come in the 
second row. The CIS countries with Russia in front have a more uncertain future and 
a more peripheral participation in the integration process. Decisive for Russia and 
other CIS countries is the development of the state. Will they succeed in building up 
a well functioning democracy with a critical opposition and an independent free 
press, which can criticize the people in power and present alternatives to corruption 
and abuse of power? Will they succeed in building up an administrative capacity, 
which can assure clear, stable and fair rules for enterprises?  
 
The West has great influence on this development. This concerns a positive attitude 
to the EU-integration process and a continued development in the economic coope-
ration. It also concerns the relation to the CIS countries where a development of the 
cooperation including support for the development of the capabilities of the state 
must be in focus to keep the transition process on track.  
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